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Achieving and maintaining solidarity in the European Union (EU)
increasingly seems challenging: political projects prioritising individual
nation states and renouncing any solidarity beyond national borders are
gaining in momentum. The 2016 ‘Brexit’ vote in the UK epitomises these
tendencies, though scepticism of any form of transnational solidarity is
certainly shared bymore Europeans than those English voters supporting
‘LEAVE’. Can the EU survive as a project of a community based on law
that promotes transnational solidarity? The EU Treaties at least express
that solidarity is one of the EU’s fundamental values (Articles 2, 3 (2)
Treaty on EuropeanUnion [TEU]). In a community of law, the validity of
this value would depend on its capacity as a legal principle. This chapter
explores whether and how far the case law of the Court of Justice (ECJ)
supports solidarity as an EU constitutional law principle.
This chapter does not endeavour to compete with the expansive dis-
cussion on what solidarity may mean.1 Instead, it focuses on the question
1 Recently see, with a focus on EU perspectives, A. Biondi, E. Dagilyte andE. Kucuk,
Solidarity in EU Law: Legal Principle in the Making (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018);
G. Butler, ‘Solidarity and its limits for economic integration in the European Union’s
internal market’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 25(3) (2018),
310–31; I. Ciornei andE. Recchi, ‘At the source of European solidarity: assessing the effects
of cross-border practices and political attitudes’, Journal of CommonMarket Studies, 55(3)
(2017), 468–85; C. Lahusen and M. Grasso (eds.), Solidarity in Europe. Citizens’ Responses
in Times of Crisis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); D. Schiek, ‘Perspectives on social
citizenship in the EU: from status positivus to status socialis activus via two forms of
transnational solidarity’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); S. Sciarra, Solidarity and Conflicts.
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of what solidarity signifies as a constitutional concept of EU law. Since
the EU’s integration project ultimately aims at linking societies of
Member States,2 it is not surprising that solidarity emerges as a central
EU value in the Treaties’ norms and preambles. Linking societies of
Member States through the integration project ultimately presupposes
that the interaction of citizens eventually leads to solidarity bonds beyond
the nation states, through a re-orientation of both Member States and
citizens towards transnational solidarity. Citizens need to be prepared to
regard citizens of other Member States as equally worthy of inclusion.3
Member states should support such developments by embracing solidar-
ity as a value of the EU that is common to the Member States.
Nevertheless, a number of authors continue to promote the limitation
of practical solidarity to the national level,4 possibly supported by
a ‘holding environment’ at EU level.5 There are reasons to doubt whether
the implicit separation of economic integration at EU level and social
integration at national levels can succeed.6 More likely, if solidarity is not
enacted at EU level, EU policies pursued may well result in social
deprivation in citizens’ lives, especially inMember States whose economy
does not yield a constant export surplus.
Instead of developing a definition of solidarity, this chapter asks what,
if anything, the case law of the ECJ7 contributes to the discursive exegesis
of solidarity as a principle of EU law. In order to answer this question, it
offers an empirical analysis of the Court’s case law framing the notion of
European Social Law in Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2018); as well as
the contributions in this edited collection.
2 D. Schiek, Economic and Social Integration. The Challenge for EU Constitutional Law
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).
3 See on this perspective: J. Gerhards and H. Lengfeld, Citizenship and Social Integration in
the European Union (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
4 E.g. under the heading of ‘conflicts law constitutionalism’ by C. Joerges, ‘Social justice in
an ever more diverse union’, in F. Vandenbroucke, C. Barnard and G. D. Baere (eds.),
A European Social Union after the Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017),
pp. 105–7.
5 F. Vandenbroucke, ‘The idea of a European social union’, in Vandenbroucke, Barnard and
Baere (eds.), A European Social Union after the Crisis, pp. 3–46.
6 Schiek, Economic and Social Integration, pp. 215–43; Schiek, Perspectives on social citizen-
ship in the EU, pp. 345–54.
7 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) consists of the Court of Justice (still
abbreviated to ECJ), the General Court (GC) and special courts, whose number can be
expanded (see Article 19 TEU). Our analysis is confined to ECJ cases, because it reviews
the case law of the GC, hears all national references (Article 267 TFEU) and thus has the
best opportunity to elaborate how EU law should interact with national law and socio-
economic reality.
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solidarity. The analysis is not limited to cases which have gained the
status of key cases in a largely undisclosed process of peer consensus.
Instead, we use a method suitable to identify all cases in which the
concept of solidarity was not only mentioned, but also relevant. Thus,
we analyse the full extent of the Court’s discourse on solidarity, rather
than adding to the literature on those cases which have long been
identified as key cases in the area.
The next section introduces the methodology used for identifying and
analysing the case law sample, and explains what this methodology seeks to
achieve. Though this chapter is not on the concept of solidarity from
a philosophical, sociological or legal theory perspective, it is necessary to
introduce the main content of solidarity as a concept in EU
(Constitutional) Law, in order to identify the dimensions and types of
solidarity we expect to find in the analysis.We distinguish four dimensions
(solidarity between citizens, between Member States and the EU, between
Member States and citizens, and international solidarity) and altogether six
types of solidarity within the subcategories categorial definition (solidarity
as charity, solidarity asmutual obligation, solidarity as riskmitigation) and
functionalities (embedding individual rights, embedding the Internal
Market, rejecting limiting effects of national solidarity). The third section
presents the results of a content analysis of ECJ case law using the term
‘solidarity’. The conclusion identifies a number of missed opportunities, in
particular in recent years and in response to events perceived as critical
junctures for the future of EU integration. The judicial response to Brexit
constitutes one prime example for this: when the Court enabled the UK to
revoke the notice of its intention to withdraw from the Union, it empha-
sised EU citizenship as fundamental status of the EUwithout any reference
to the solidarity dimension of EU citizenship.8 We conclude that there is
much space for solidarity becoming more relevant to the Court’s case law.
2 Analysing the Court’s Discourse on Solidarity –Why and How
In analysing the Court’s case law on solidarity, this chapter exposes the
textual discourses of the Court’s case law through an empirical analysis.9
The purpose of this investigation is both explanatory and normative.
8 This is discussed in more detail below, in the text around note 83.
9 On this see already D. Schiek, ‘Is there a social ideal of the European Court of Justice?’, in:
U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen and L. Roseberry (eds.), The Role of Courts in Developing
a European Social Model (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2010), pp. 63–96; D. Schiek,
‘Social ideals of the Court of Justice of the European Union’, in: T. Evas, U. Liebert and
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In so far as it is explanatory, the chapter contributes to understanding
how judges deal with law’s indeterminacy, as well as uncovering judges’
ideas on adequate organisation of society represented in case law, which
will be influential on the Court’s future case law and on EU law- and
policy-making more generally.10 There is little doubt that the ECJ relies on
more than positive law in its rulings. This is a logical consequence of law’s
principled indeterminacy, which requires any court to produce rules and
participate in governance of society by making law, alongside parliaments
and government.11 As a consequence, no court can be but a political and
social actor in deciding which aspects of an indeterminate norm to stress.12
For the EU judiciary, this role is compounded by its character as
a constitutional court, whose tasks extend beyond mere interpretation
of positive law. Article 19 Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires the
Court to ‘ensure that in interpretation and application of the Treaties
the law is observed’. This phrase distinguishes between the positive law of
the Treaties and the law elsewhere, referring to the difference between lex
C. Lord (eds.), Multilayered Representation in the European Union: Parliaments, Courts
and the Public Sphere (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), pp. 157–82.
10 E. Achtsioglou and M. Doherty, ‘There must be some way out of here: the crisis, labour
rights and member states in the eye of the storm’, European Law Journal, 20(2) 2014,
219–40, at 233–5.
11 Aside from profound differences in detail, there is agreement in so far between linguists,
positivists and different jurisprudential schools. Linguists agree on the existence of
imbued meaning and the necessity of drawing on circumstantial knowledge when under-
standing textual language, which is also the starting point of critical discourse analysis, see
T. v Leeuwen, ‘Discourse as recontextualisation of social practice: a guide’, in R. Wodak
and M. Meyer (eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd edition (London: Sage,
2009), p. 147. Positivist legal theorists acknowledge the open texture of law as described
above, see L. Hart, The Concept of Law (with a postscript by Penelope Bulloch and Joseph
Raz), 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 118, 123–26, but may
prefer other terms, including ‘uncertainty’ (Hart) or judicial discretion or choice, see
D. Leczykiewicz, ‘Why do the European Court of Justice judges need legal concepts?’,
European Law Journal, 14(6) 2008, 773–86, at 774.
12 This is upheld widely for the ECJ, see for example A. Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of
Justice and the judicialization of EU governance’, Living Reviews in European Governance,
5(2) 2010, 7–9; see also J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, ‘Integration
and integrity in the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice’, in G. d. Búrca and
J. H.Weiler (eds.), The European Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),
p. 43, who question the concept of a clear line between law and politics underlying the
critique of the Court, suggesting that the challenge is to manage the inevitable overlap
between law and politics in constitutional adjudication. The EU’s highest judge accepts
the necessity of ‘non-deductive’ arguments, i.e. reasoning not reliant on the text of EU
norms, as a reality in the Court’s daily work. K. Lenaerts, ‘Discovering the law of the EU:
the European Court of Justice and the comparative method’, in T. Perisin and S. Rodin
(eds.), The Transformation or Reconstitution of Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2018), p. 61.
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and ius, which is acknowledged by most European languages.13 The
Court is thus charged with ensuring the congruence of positive law
with justice derived from supra-positive law.14 Contrary to a popular
critique, fulfilling a constitutional court’s task of deriving general prin-
ciples of law from supra-positive sources does not constitute any illegi-
timate usurpation of parliamentary or government functions.
The question remains how the Court discharges with the task of
finding justice beyond the positive law – and this is the question the
selected method sets out to answer. It starts where the traditional
methods of interpreting the positive law end, exploring how judges
use their ‘imagination’15 through a systematic analysis of the Court’s
paradigmatic engagement with discourses in national societies and the
emerging European society. It thus complements the academic works
on the Court as a political actor.16 In doing so, it shares some common
ground with legal realism, a school which in the USA has seen a revival
as New Legal Realism from 2005,17 and is closely linked to empirical
legal studies dedicated to either predicting future case law or to analys-
ing interaction of societies with courts from.18 New European Legal
Realism19 relates to this school as well as to Scandinavian Realism
13 See also F. Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law. The European Way (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
14 See also T. Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union’, in R. Schütze and
T. Tridimas (eds.), Oxford Principles of European Union Law, Volume 1: The European
Union Legal Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 583.
15 L. Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the social market economy’, Common Market Law
Review, 45(5) 2008, 1335–46, at 1339–40.
16 See for example K. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009); D. Sindbjerg Martinsen, An Ever More Powerful Court? The
Political Constraints of Legal Integration in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015); Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice and the judicializa-
tion of EU governance’.
17 See H. Erlanger et al., ‘Is it time for a new legal realism?’,Wisconsin Law Review, 2005(2)
(2005), 353–63; V.Nourse and G. Shaffer, ‘Varieties of new legal realism: can a new world
order prompt a new legal theory?’, Cornell Law Review, 95(1) (2010), 61–138.
18 N. Barber, ‘Legal realism, pluralism and their challengers’, in U. Neegard and R. Nielsen
(eds.), European Legal Method – Towards a New European Legal Realism? (Copenhagen:
DJØF Publishing, 2013), pp. 189–209; M. C. Suchman and E. Mertz, ‘Towards an new
legal empiricism: empirical legal studies and new legal realism’, Annual Review of Law
and Society, 6(2010), 555–79; for a European example of new legal empirics attempting to
predict ECJ case law see M. Malecki, ‘Do ECJ judges all speak with the same voice?
Evidence of divergent preferences from the judgments of the chambers’, Journal of
European Public Policy, 19(1) (2012), 59–75.
19 H. Koch, K. Hagel-Sørensen, U. Haltern and J.Weiler (eds.), Europe. The New Legal
Realism (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2010); U. Neergaard and R. Nielsen (eds.),
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a jurisprudential school seeking to derive the content of the law from
observation of its operation, distancing itself from any normative
theory.20 A pragmatist approach led to observing the use of a variety
of sources, including ideologies and the Zeitgeist.21 The approach taken
here takes on board the numerical dimension of empirical legal realism,
though it is not concerned with judicial behaviour.22
The point of social ideal analysis is to identify the ideational and zeitgeisty
elements of case law. Presupposing that law as a whole is a social practice,23
the textual analysis addresses the discursive practice of courts. A court’s
discourse, though inherently authoritative, is not independent from other
discursive practices in society. Law while endowed with its own internal
logic, is at best semi-autonomous, but never fully self-referential.24
European Legal Method – Towards a New European Legal Realism? (Copenhagen: DJØF
Publishing, 2013).
20 R. Nielsen, ‘Legal realism and EU law’, in H. Koch, K. Hagel-Sørensen, U. Haltern and
J. Weiler (eds.), Europe. The New Legal Realism (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2010),
pp. 545–63; R. Nielsen, ‘New European legal realism – new problems, new solutions?’, in
U. Neeergaard and R. Nielsen (eds.), European Legal Method – Towards a New European
Legal Realism? (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2013), pp. 75–124.
21 The latter is perceived as the base of Hjalte Rasmussen’s European legal realism, see
M. R. Madsen, ‘Scandinavian (neo-)realism and European courts’, in H. Koch, K. Hagel-
Sørensen, U. Haltern and J. H. Weiler (eds.), Europe: The New Legal Realism
(Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2010), pp. 437–55.
22 As are some of the legal realists from both sides of the Atlantic do: the US new legal
realists Leiter describes analysing what courts do as the main interest of new and old legal
realists, B. Leiter, ‘Legal realisms, old and new’, Valparaiso Law Review, 47(4) (2013),
949–963, while Nourse and Shaffer see judicial behaviour studies as only one of three
strands of new legal realism, V. Nourse and G. Shaffer, ‘Varieties of new legal realism: can
a new world order prompt a new legal theory?’, Cornell Law Review, 95(1) (2010), 61–138.
For Scandinavian legal realists, courts are an important, if not the most important site of
exploration, as law only becomes real when it is applied, Nielsen, ‘New European legal
realism – new problems, new solutions?’, pp. 95–9).
23 As a social practice, law only maintains a relative autonomy from socio-economic reality
in which it develops, for Bourdieu the main distinction of his approach to law from
Luhmann’s systems theory, P. Bordieu, ‘The force of law: towards a sociology of the
juridical field’, The Hastings Law Journal, 38 (1987), 805–53, at 816–53). For a more
recent summary of law as a social practice see A. Marmor, ‘The nature of law’, in
E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University, 2011).
24 Tuori suggests that systems theory might be usefully applied to the relation between law
and politics, but loses its value in relating law to societies, K. Tuori, ‘The relationality of
European constitution(s). Justifying a new research programme for European constitu-
tional scholarship’, in U. Neergaard and R. Nielsen (eds.), European Legal Method:
Towards a New Legal Realism? (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2013), pp. 26–30, with
references to Luhman and Teubner. By contrast, Grimmel suggests that law relates to
‘political realities’, A. Grimmel, ‘The uniting of Europe by transclusion: understanding
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The normative dimension of the analysis is based on the assumption
that case law as a discourse is constitutive of the EU’s constitutional
practice as well as conditioned by its normative foundations. Thus, the
content of the Court’s discourse matters, in that it conveys the finer
granules of grand constitutional principles such as solidarity. In other
words, we contend that what matters is not merely the Court’s reaction
to the increasing media coverage of its case law,25 but also the Court’s
contribution to shaping the discourses on the content of central EU
constitutional principles. It is the Court’s privilege and opportunity to
communicate to the public the content of those principles applied to
everyday cases on the ground. The increasingly thorough press coverage
of the Court’s case law is only one indication of its relevance for the
emerging European public sphere, and the EU’s perception as
a community of values. In times where solidarity of the Union with its
Member States and its citizens is frequently doubted, nothing could be
more important than a careful discourse of the Court filling solidarity as
a central legal value of the EU26 with life.
Conceiving EU case law as discourse that is socially constitutive and
conditioned at the same time requires certain methodological choices. The
assumption that the authority of case law is imbued in the text of the
judgments, rather than in the persons of the judges, is a central tenet of social
ideal analysis: its chosen method is a critical textual analysis. This textual
approach is particularly adequate to the ECJ with its predominantly docu-
ment-based procedure,27 which also has engendered the habit of repeating
the contextual conditions of integration through law’, Journal of European Integration, 36
(6) (2014), pp. 549–66, at 555, while having indicated earlier that it is autonomous from
societal impact. A. Grimmel, ‘Judicial interpretation or judicial activism? The legacy of
rationalism in the studies of the European Court of Justice’, European Law Journal, 18(4)
(2012), 518–35, at 519.
25 M. Blauberger et al., ‘The ECJ Judges read themorning papers. Explaining the turnaround
of European citizenship jurisprudence’, Journal of European Public Policy, 25(10) (2018),
1422–41.
26 As impressively presented by AG Bot in his opinion in case C-643/15 Slovakia v Council
EU:C:2017:618, paragraphs 18, ‘Solidarity is among the cardinal values of the Union and
is even among the foundations of the Union. How would it be possible to deepen the
solidarity between the peoples of Europe and to envisage ever closer union between those
people, as advocated in the Preamble to the EU Treaty, without solidarity between the
Member States when one of them is faced with an emergency situation? I am referring
here to the quintessence of what is both the raison d’être and the objective of the
European project.’
27 Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union’, pp. 599–601, pointing to the
influence of English judges, which nudges the Court towards appreciating the oral
elements of the procedure. This influence will decrease, though.
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certain formulas verbatim in long lines of judgments.28 The texts of these
judgments are enunciated as collective decisions, much to the dismay of
authors based in common law legal cultures with amore rhetorical tradition
of adjudication.29 This further supports the argument that at least for the ECJ
it is adequate to evaluate the discourse transported by the texts themselves,
rather than investigating the judges’ motives.30 The suggested research
method thus utilises the abilities for hermeneutic analysis engendered by
a legal education, and honed in legal scholarship.31 It also goes well beyond
classical legal method in its ambition to uncover ideals hidden in legal texts
written by courts. This excludes following the conventional legal research
method, which would focus on key cases that are identified as key cases
through a process of peer conformity.32 If we aim to capture the potential
impact of judicial texts, we need to consider the totality of a certain case law
section. Treating case law as empirical data in thisway enhances the potential
to generate new knowledge by establishing unique databases of case law. For
the CJEU, this kind of analysis is eased by the existence of a searchable text
data base, which enables researchers to use their own search terms and thus
to capture the full extent of case law relevant to certain key concepts.
3 Solidarity as a Concept in EU Constitutional Law
This section establishes the conceptual matrix against which the notion of
solidarity in ECJ case law will be analysed. To this end, it first sketches
28 On the dominance of civil law traditions in the Court’s procedure and practice see
V. Perju, ‘Reason and authority in the European Court of Justice’, Virginia Journal of
International Law, 49(2) (2009), 307–77, at 357.
29 Malecki, ‘Do ECJ judges all speak with the same voice?’; Perju, V., ‘Reason and authority
in the European Court of Justice’.
30 M. Everson and J. Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution: Judes and Law Beyond
Constitutive Power (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), aim at unearthing those motives by
interviewing judges. Similar aims can be pursued by combining case law analysis with
experiments involving non-judicial actors, K. J. Bybee, ‘Paying attention to what judges
say: new directions in the study of judicial decisionmaking’, Annual Review of Law and
Social Science, 8(2012), 69–84, at 74.
31 US Legal Realism has been criticised for not applying social science methodology con-
sistently: realists, it is suggested, only do what lawyers do best: reading and analysing and
systematising case law, B. Leiter, ‘Legal realisms, old and new’,Valparaiso Law Review, 47
(4) (2013), 949–63.
32 For a traditional defence of this for EU law see G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning
and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). From
a more critical perspective, referring to the common law see J. Morison, ‘What makes an
important case? A research agenda’, Legal Information Management, 12(4) (2012),
251–61.
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solidarity as a concept, and then turns to it specification as an EU legal
principle. Finally, dimensions and types of solidarity in EU constitutional
law are identified, to serve as a coding system for analysing the Court’s case
law, alongside the policyfields inwhich solidarity can be expected to be used.
3.1 Solidarity as a Concept
Solidarity as a concept is not inherently legal. It originated as a fundamental
concept in sociology and philosophy. The dualism proposed by Durkheim
seems relatively modest today: he distinguished between mechanic solidar-
ity, which is based on ties developed in small, closed groups (for example, by
kinship), and organic solidarity, which emerges in industrial societies
dependant on exchange between their individual members. Mechanic soli-
darity appears as a condition experienced as natural obligation, perhaps
experienced as inescapable fate, or obligation.33 Organic solidarity requires
effort by a developed society, and the concept has been considered as
unrealistic by critical voices.34 Solidarity as a Weberian concept has been
characterised as special type of social relationship established by the orga-
nising power of a polity.35 Habermas’ concept implicitly builds on the latter,
in that Habermas characterises solidarity as emerging from a ‘social
context . . . created through politics’,36 in which the concept of fraternity
and solidarity were initially used synonymously to capture the bond ema-
nating from common humaneness in a ‘secular religion of humanity’.37
From a Weberian and/or Habermasian perspective, solidarity is congruent
with the organic interrelation of members of the same social class after
industrialisation. Solidarity also succeeded charity as a social institution
offering relief to the poor: instead of hoping for gaining income from
altruistic activities of the better off, the expansion of the non-possessing
classes also enabled them to mutually support each other. Solidarity as risk
mitigation through mutual obligation was born in the mutual societies in
the early industrial age in Europe.38 This element of solidarity is not always
33 See on the latter A. Somek, ‘Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European
citizenship’, European Law Review, 36(6) (2007), 787–818.
34 F. d. Witte, ‘The end of EU citizenship and the means of non-discrimination’,Maastricht
Journal of Comparative and European Law, 18(1–2) (2011), 86–108.
35 M. Ross, ‘Solidarity – a new constitutional paradigm for the EU?’, in Promoting Solidarity
in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 26.
36 J. Habermas, The Lure of Technocracy (London: Polity Press, 2015), p. 26.
37 Habermas, The Lure of Technocracy, p. 27
38 See for example J. Zeitlin, ‘From labour history to the history of industrial relations’, The
Economic Historic Review, 40(2) (1987), 159–84.
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recognised, in particular by writers who use solidarity as an overarching
term encompassing altruistic activities as well as activities based on mutual-
ity, that is, collective interest. For example, Stjernø’s39 conceptual matrix
proposes a continuum from solidarity based on homogeneity, with a strong
collective orientation, over solidarity through shared interests towards
a universal solidarity towards the whole of humankind, with the latter
category building on the more compassionate and altruistic motives of
caring for humanity.
Understanding solidarity not as a feeling, or orientation, but rather as
a set of potential courses of actions shaped by institutional environments,
we can distinguish between participative and receptive solidarity.40 The
former is expressed by collective or common action of those connected
by common interests, while the latter is experienced in receiving benefits
or other payments. As expanded before, both forms of solidarity move
beyond solidarity as charity or spontaneous emotion in that they are
organised on the basis of principles and norms, frequently enshrined in
law. This corresponds to the fact that solidarity in post-mechanic socie-
ties in the Durkheimian sense depends on institutions, such as rights
guarantees. These presuppose interaction with fellow citizens for crea-
tion and enforcement, as well as a constituted polity. Those interactions
are not necessarily constrained within the boundaries of nation states.
They could potentially encompass the world, or in our case transcend
borders within the transnational entity constituted by the EU.
3.2 Solidarity in the EU Treaties
The EU since the Treaty of Lisbon, has enhanced its statutory commit-
ment to solidarity, giving rise to solidarity as a new constitutional
principle.41 According to the TEU preamble, the Union is motivated by
the desire to deepen solidarity between theMember States’ peoples, while
the preamble to the TFEU adds solidarity between the EU and the over-
seas countries, as already contained in the preamble to the Treaty on
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty).42
39 S. Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009).
40 Schiek, ‘Perspectives on social citizenship in the EU’.
41 See Ross, ‘Solidarity – a new constitutional paradigm for the EU?’.
42 U. Neergaard, ‘In search of the role of solidarity in primary law and the case law of the
European Court of Justice’, in U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen and L. Roseberry (eds.), The Role
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The first mentioning of solidarity in the Treaties appears in the
TEU provision of values of the Union, which links the concept to
the society:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, free-
dom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are
common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail. (Article 2 TEU)
The fact that solidarity is only mentioned in the second sentence
may be read as incorporating a certain scepticism towards solidarity
as a European value. Such scepticism would be based on the idea
that activities epitomising solidarity, such as asset distribution and
community building, require a pre-legal and pre-constitutional bond
between peoples that does not exist beyond the boundaries of nation
states. In this narrative, any dense constitution rooted in societies
can only prevail in Member States, while the EU can never hope to
proceed beyond mere formal or ‘international’ ties between Member
States.43 However, taking Article 2 TEU seriously, we suggest that
the long process of constructing this provision44 did purposely result
in a clause which conceptually links Member States and the Union
through the value of solidarity. It is correct that the provision lists
the ingredients of liberalist constitutionalism in its first sentence,
which may conjure the image of an abstentionist Union neither
actively safeguarding human rights nor promoting their factual rele-
vance. However, even that first sentence lists human dignity as
a value, which constitutes a reference to the humane beyond liberal
notions.45 The first sentence also refers to equality, which again
limits a mere liberal constitutional stance in that equal freedom
demands an equitable distribution of assets.46 Finally, the link
between the first and the second sentence and the contents of
of Courts in Developing a European Social Model (Copenhagen: DJOV Publishing, 2010),
pp. 97–138, reproduces specifications of solidarity in the EEC and EC treaties.
43 See, for example, D. Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), pp. 164–5.
44 Article 2 TEU was originally drafted in the Constitutional Convention.
45 On this see D. Kostakopoulou and N. Ferreira, The Human Face of the European Union:
Are EU Law and Policy Humane Enough? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015).
46 U. Steinvorth, Gleiche Freiheit. Politische Philosophie der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1999).
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the second sentence matter. The second sentence links the values to
the Member States, these are their common values. It also links them
to the society (singular), instead of using the grammatical plural
(societies). Article 2 TEU second sentence does thus not refer to
national societies, conceiving these as distinct entities in each
Member State. Instead, the provision presupposes that one
European (or EUropean) society is emerging through the medium
of European integration. Article 2 TEU posits normatively that this
European society is informed by solidarity among other principles. It
also relates to the Member States, thus paying tribute to the multi-
level nature of the EU. Solidarity thus becomes a precondition for
the existence of the EU’s values.
3.3 Identifying Dimensions and Types of Solidarity for Coding Case
Law Analysis
Even in the absence of a specific definition of solidarity as a constitutional
key concept, the Treaties provide some orientation in that they specify
relational dimensions of solidarity:47 solidarity between the Union and
Member States, solidarity between Member States, solidarity between
Member States and citizens (of other Member States) and solidarity
between individuals (for example, between generations). While it may
seem counterintuitive that institutions such as the Member States or the
EU as such can engage in solidarity, solidarity between the Union and the
Member States, as well as mutual solidarity of Member States ultimately
serves the ever closer union of peoples (Article 1 TEU), and thus also
citizens, albeit indirectly. If Member States are required to exercise
solidarity towards citizens of other Member States, this constitutes indir-
ect solidarity of their citizens with those EU foreigners: after all the
exercise in solidarity diminishes the funds available for national citizens.
Similarly, solidarity between Member States can be viewed as indirect
solidarity between their citizens as well. With this qualification, we arrive
at four dimensions of solidarity, as indicated in the graph below.
Regarding the different notions of solidarity as they may emerge from
the historical origin of the concept and different ideational approaches to
47 See also I. Domurath, The three dimensions of solidarity in the EU legal order: limits of
the judicial and legal approach’, Journal of European Integration, 35(4) (2013), 459–475;
P. Hilpold, ‘Understanding solidarity within EU law: an analysis of the “islands of
solidarity” with particular regard to monetary union’, Yearbook of European Law, 34(1)
(2015), 257–85.
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its use, the Treaties do not offer any orientation. Thus, we would expect
that the Court (alongside national courts, whose case law on solidarity
under EU law is beyond the confines of this chapter) interprets and
specifies solidarity. Deriving from the cursory overview of different
approaches to solidarity, we would expect the case law to move between
five types of solidarity, which on the one hand categorise solidarity and
on the other hands allocate functions to solidarity specific for EU con-
stitutional law.
We can distinguish three categorial types of solidarity. First, there is
the option that solidarity is defined as the continuity of charity from pre-
modern times. This form of solidarity would be characterised by
a voluntary activity based on entirely altruistic motives, where the actor
may follow an ethical or moral impetus, but which is beyond the realm of
legal obligation. Second, if embracing the conceptual shift from charita-
ble care for the poor to self-government of those who can only rely on
their own work to sustain themselves, the notion of solidarity changes
fundamentally. Solidarity is not a noble act based on potentially con-
descending altruism, but rather in principle based on mutual support.
Instead, the contribution to a solidarity system are undertaken in the
understanding that standing together individuals can shoulder risks they
would be unable to bear individually. Even for the lucky ones who never
need to rely on the activation of solidarity, being part of the system of
mutual contributions grants the trust that they could rely on the collec-
tive. This leads to the third categorial type of solidarity, in which soli-
darity mitigates risks emanating from a fundamentally risky economic
process governed not by plan and structure, but instead bymarket forces.
In order to mitigate these market-driven risks, it is necessary to combine
forces – even though there is no guarantee that each contribution
(whether monetary or in kind) will be valued by actual support.
The categorial types of solidarity imply the functional types, which
identify for which purpose (within the EU integration project) solidarity
can be used. Here we expected two different types. Solidarity requires the
obligation to contribute to a system even if an individual may not gain
from his or her contributions. In a way solidarity thus defies individual










Figure 12.1 Dimensions of solidarity
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rights, which would demand that relinquishing property is rewarded in
proportion to the contribution made. This means that the existence of
solidarity bonds can also be used to justify limiting individual rights.
Expressed differently, solidarity as a legal principle reminds us of the
relational character of rights guarantees: rights can only be enjoyed in
association with others, by an individual embedded in society. Solidarity
thus serves to embed individual rights in society, or in the transnational
integration of societies within the EU. While the fourth type of solidarity
serves to embed individual rights, a fifth type is to be expected in the
European Union as an entity integrating markets through legally
enforceable institutions such as the economic freedoms and competition
law. Those institutions frequently clash with national institutions estab-
lished to engender that risk mitigation which is addressed by the second
dimension of solidarity. Organising processes at national, subnational or
perhaps even transnational level on the basis of solidarity can thus serve
to justify restrictions of economic freedoms or the non-applicability of
EU competition law because the entity acting on a market cannot be
considered as an undertaking due to its solidarity-based constitution.
The categorial and functional types of solidarity are conceptually
distinguished, though we must expect some overlap in the case law
analysis: as stated, the limitation of individual rights as well as EU
market-integrating concepts such as economic freedoms and competi-
tion rules is closely related to the function of solidarity as creating mutual
obligations and as enabling the mitigation of risks. Case law categorisa-
tion will thus have to identify which type is most relevant to the case at
hand.
4 Analysing CJEU Case Law in the Field
4.1 Identifying relevant cases
In order to identify all the cases using solidarity, the search function on case
law on the CJEU web page was utilised. The search was limited to closed
cases, and to those decided by the ECJ. The search for the term ‘solidarity’
for the period from thebeginning of records in 1958 toMarch2019brought
solidarity as 















Figure 12.2 Categorial and functional types of solidarity
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up 348 cases. For the evaluation, cases were excluded where ‘solidarity’ is
cited from the name of parties, national institutions, national or EU
legislation, although neither the EU Commission, any of the parties, the
advocate general (AG)or theCourt engaged substantivelywith the concept.
These exclusions left 122 cases for evaluation.48
4.2 Analysis Step One: Overall Picture
The use of solidarity increases considerably over time, as can be established
by grouping the analysis into five periods, separated by treaty reforms.
As the Figure 12.3 demonstrates, the ECJ did not depend on explicit treaty
provisions on solidarity to develop the concept. The first case to mention
solidarity was decided in December 1969,49 and twelve more cases followed
until the Single EuropeanActwas adopted. The notion of solidaritywas used
in a variety of areas, including value added tax, accession of the UK, staff
regulations, agriculture and fisheries, as well as the fields identified as
particularly relevant from today’s perspective. Nevertheless, the use of soli-
darity in the Court’s case law remained comparatively infrequent after the








1969 – 1986 1987–1993 1994–1999 2000–2009 2010–2019
EU and MS towards each other MS towards citizens
EU Citizen to EU citizen International Solidarity
all
Figure 12.3 Frequency of dimensions of solidarity in ECJ case law over time
48 Tables 12.1–5 listing the 122 cases chronologically and identifying which dimension and
type of solidarity they were categorised under are available at the end of the chapter.
49 Case 6/69 COM v. France EU:C:1969:68.
266 dagmar schiek
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014








































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014













































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014














































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014






































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014










































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014









































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014



















































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014




























































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014















































































































































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014













































































































































































































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Queen's University Belfast, on 31 Mar 2021 at 11:11:03, subject to the Cambridge Core
Maastricht (in force in November 1993) introduced EU citizenship expli-
citly. The surge in cases after theTreaty ofAmsterdamcame into force by the
endof 1999 seems attributable to twoelements:first, EUcitizenshiphadbeen
recognised as obligingMember States to extend a certain degree of solidarity
to citizens of otherMember States, and second the heightened recognition of
EU social policy through the re-integration of the 1993 protocol on social
policy, and the creation of an employment chapter in 1997 may have
promoted reasoning with social policy and solidarity considerations in
order to curb individual rights as well as internal market rules. Overall, the
EU internal dimensions of solidarity occur nearly equally, though interna-
tional solidarity is very rarely used, as the pie chart above shows.
4.3 Confirming the Types of Solidarity Actually Used by the Court
In evaluating the case law, all five types of solidarity we expected to find
were identifiable: the categorial types solidarity as charitable orientation
without legal obligation (1), solidarity as mutually binding legal obliga-
tion (2) and solidarity as riskmitigation (3) alongside the functional types
of solidarity embedding or restricting individual rights (4) or internal
market concepts (5).
In addition to those five types, there was an unexpected instrumental use
of solidarity by the Court, supporting the overall value of European integra-
tion. This is evidenced in two different ways. First, the Court used solidarity
as an emanation of mutually binding legal obligation as a basis for support-










Citizens to each other
EU to MS, MS to MS
International Solidarity
Figure 12.4 Dimensions of solidarity – frequency over time
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obligations under EU law would enhance the mutuality of this
organisation. In the very first case using the concept, decided in
1969, French attempts to mitigate the effect of the 1960s economic
crisis by awarding rediscount rates for local business in contraven-
tion of EEC state aid law were branded as a violation of the
solidarity base of Member States’ obligations to the community.50
Similarly, the legitimacy of quotas for production of agricultural
goods is supported by the principle of solidarity between
producers.51 This use of solidarity is now occurring in the field of
asylum and immigration, where the specific reference to Member
States’ solidarity to each other is used in recent judgments to under-
line the admissibility of legally enforceable quotas for admitting
refugees.52 Generally, this can be characterised as within the bound-
aries of the second categorial type of solidarity identified above,
solidarity as mutual obligation, though with an integrationist twist.
This was recognised by counting those cases as a (2a) category.
Second, the Court frequently has to react to Member States’ and
citizens’ arguments relying on solidarity structures established at
national level in order to justify an exception from or restriction of EU
law concepts central to socio-economic integration. For example,
Member States may argue that a certain benefit or institution is based
on the specific bond of solidarity between citizens of the state, and refuse
to extend that benefit to EU citizens from other Member States.
Accepting such an argument would endanger the wider aim of creating
solidarity bonds not only between Member States, but also between their
peoples. In particular if derogations from obligations flowing from eco-
nomic freedoms or competition law are at stake, the Court frequently
stresses that the EU principles prevail over that local or national solidar-
ity. Similarly, if claimants rely on national solidarity, the Court may
refuse to recognise this kind of solidarity as a concept of community
law.53 We class this as an additional criterion (6), exposing more clearly
where the Court rejects the central value of solidarity in favour of other
EU values, although either the Court, or the Commission or the AG has
recognised the relevance of the value.
Figures 12.6 and 12.7 illustrate how frequently each of these six types of
solidarity appear. The pie chart on overall distribution exposes the
50 Case 6/69 Commission v. France EU:C:1969:68.
51 Case 250/84 Eridania EU :C :1986 :22.
52 C-643/15 Slovakia v. Council CU:C:2-18:631.
53 Case 44/84 Hurd EU:C:1986:2.
solidarity in the case law of the ecj 289
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014








































































































































































terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766593.014
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Queen's University Belfast, on 31 Mar 2021 at 11:11:03, subject to the Cambridge Core
dominance of the internal market category, while the next chart illus-
trates how the frequency of the different types of solidarity evolved over
time. The overall frequency, depicted above in figure 12.7, was omitted in
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EU law trumps national solidarity
Figure 12.7 Types of solidarity over time, plus 2a category
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4.4 Exploring the Discourse within Six Types of Solidarity
This section offers examples of how the different types of solidarity
manifest in the Court’s case law discourse.
4.4.1 Categorial Types: Solidarity as Charity, as Mutual
Obligation and as Risk Mitigation
While there are only eight cases in which the Court embraced the
traditional concept of solidarity as a voluntarily chosen benign act,
based on charitable motives, this category trends upwardly and
comprises some widely debated rulings. For example, the Pringle
judgment54 refers explicitly to Article 122 TFEU as embodying the
spirit of solidarity between the Member States, only to reject that
provision as a basis for financial assistance of the Union to the
Member States, without any reference to the principle of solidarity.
AG Kokott55 relies on the fundamental position of solidarity among
the EU’s values for a narrow interpretation of Article 125 TFEU,
which then does not exclude creating a fund providing aid to
Member States through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
However, as the Court, she does not in any way contribute to
defining solidarity. In both instances, solidarity remains a nebulous
concept potentially based on charity towards Member States suffer-
ing an economic crisis. Instead, solidarity could have been portrayed
as a rational concept retaining the Union’s resilience against inevi-
table risks emanating from a market-based economy. Similarly,
a pre-modern concept of solidarity was used in two cases on allocat-
ing funds to peace-programmes in Northern Ireland. In 1999 the
Court rejected an action brought by Italy, demanding that the
Commission enacts a legal instrument to reduce the allocation to
the structural funds in favour of the PEACE programme, following
AG Mischo’s reasoning that solidarity and social cohesion are incap-
able of engendering specific obligations.56 A decade later, the Court
uses the same rational for justifying the EC’s contribution to the
International Fund for Ireland.57 At times the Court also retracts to
this conservative and cautious reading of solidarity if activities at
54 Case C-370/12 EU:C:2012:756, paragraph 115.
55 View in case C-370/12 EU:C:2012:675, paragraphs 142-3.
56 Case C-107/99 Italy v. Commission EU:C:1999:338.
57 Case C-166/07, Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2009:499.
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national level of a social character are to be exempted from limita-
tions, they would have to endure under EU Internal Market law. For
example, in the Sodemare case, the Court exempted the statutory
preference for non-profit organisation to provide locally funded care
for the elderly from the control under EU state aid law because the
system of social welfare was ‘based on the principle of solidarity (in
that it was) designed as a matter of priority to assist those who are in
a state of need owing to insufficient family income’;58 and in the
more recent Femarbel case59 the ‘activities essential in order to
guarantee human dignity and integrity and are a manifestation of
the principle of . . . solidarity’ were exempt from the restrictions
imposed by Directive 2006/13.
While all these judgments justify initiatives that could be cate-
gorised as emanations of solidarity, they miss the opportunity to
recognise that the exercise of solidarity is actually in the interest
both of those in short term receipt of aid (whether Member States
experiencing difficulty servicing their government debt, a region
suffering from the aftermath of decades of neglect, or citizens lack-
ing the income to lead a life in dignity) and those engaging in
solidarity. This would have allowed the court to identify the mutual
interest of maintaining the prosperity of the Union and its societies
as a whole.
As mentioned, the category of solidarity as legally binding mutual
obligation initiated the Court’s solidarity case law, and was initially
used as a basis for Member States obligations to comply with their
treaty obligations, for example, by branding the UK’s refusal to
require lorry drivers to use tachographs in order to ensure compli-
ance with working time rules as ‘failure in the duty of solidarity’ of
Member States towards the EEC, which struck ‘at the very root of
the Community legal order’.60
The idea of solidarity as mutuality also underpins case law on EU
citizenship. After first enunciating the slogan that Member States
were required to extend a certain degree of (financial) solidarity to
citizens of other Member States61 without much reasoning, the Court
58 Case C-70/95 Sodemare et al. ECLI:EU:C:1997:30, paragraph 27.
59 Case C-57/12 Femarbel – ECLI:EU:C:2013:517, paragraph 43.
60 Case 127/78 Commission v. UK EU:C:1979:32, paragraph 12, see also case 39/72
Commission v. Italy EU:C:1973:13 paragraph 25 and cases cited above in fn 50–2.
61 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk EU:C:2001:458, paragraph 44.
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has increasingly relied on the ‘genuine link’ between the host Member
State and the other EU citizen to support that obligation, thus
injecting the criterion of mutuality. For example, in an infringement
action concerning reduced fares for students against Austria, the
Court conceded that ‘it is legitimate for a host Member State to
wish to ensure that there is a genuine link between a claimant to
a benefit and the competent Member State’,62 though in the specific
case being effectively enrolled in a publicly accredited higher educa-
tion institution should be sufficient to establish this genuine link,63 as
was the fact that pensioners have moved to that Member State to
enjoy their old age.64 In the more recent case law on EU citizenship
rights, the Court relies on liberal notions of citizenship instead of
referring to solidarity and mutuality. One example is the Chavez-
Vilchez litigation65 on the right of non-EU mothers of Dutch children
to remain in the Netherlands as carers. The last occasion when the
requirement of Member States to extend a certain degree of solidarity
towards citizens of other EU Member States in the area of residence
rights was referred to was AG Wahl’s opinion in the 2012 St Prix
case.66
Recent rulings in the field of asylum and immigration policy demon-
strate a more pronounced use by the Court and its advocates general of
the principle of solidarity. The confidence of Member States in other
states in the Schengen Area carrying out controls effectively and strin-
gently becomes an emanation of solidarity between Member States
under Article 67 TFEU in the ANAFE case.67 AG Wathelet, in a case
on international protection, is moved to base a suggestion for future
legislation on the principle of solidarity, explaining ‘that only the
adoption of a genuine policy on international protection within the
European Union with its own budget which would ensure uniform
minimum living conditions for the beneficiaries of such protection
62 Case C-75/11 Commission v. Austria EU:C:2012:605, paragraph 59.
63 Ibid., paragraph 64.
64 Case C-140/12 Brey EU:C:2013:565.
65 Case C-133/15 (Grand Chamber), EU:C:2017:354, Opinion AG Spzunar EU:C:2016:659,
referring to ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred by virtue of their
status’ as EU citizens in the pivotal Ruiz Zambrano case (Case C-34/09 EU:C :2011 :124,
paragraph 43).
66 C-507/12 Opinion ECLI:EU:C:2013:841, St Prix.
67 Case C-606/01 ANAFE EU:C:2012:348, paragraph 25.
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would reduce, if not eliminate, the occurrence of cases such as that at
issue in the main proceedings, by ensuring that the principle of soli-
darity and the fair sharing of responsibilities between Member States
enshrined in Article 80 TFEU is a reality for the benefit not only of
Member States, but above all of the human beings concerned’.68
Nevertheless, relying on the law as it stands, he proposes for the
Court to find that the Member State Germany must request
a Gambian national to be retransferred to Italy, where he first made
an application for international protection.69
The classical concept of solidarity as risk mitigating is obviously at
the heart of social security provision in the EU’s Member States.
Accordingly, it is no surprise that the idea of solidarity as risk
mitigation is referred to in the Court’s case law on compulsory
affiliation to social security bodies. The Kattner Stahlbau litigation
is a prominent example, also because the term solidarity is found no
less than twenty-two times in that ruling. The Court finds that the
compulsory affiliation of employers to a liability fund providing for
consequences of work accidents is necessary because ‘different
employers’ liability insurance associations being grouped together in
a risk community . . . enables them to effect an equalisation of costs
and risks between them’.70 The principle of risk sharing is also
characteristic of social insurance institutions such as pension funds
which accept members independently of the individual risks they
present, and allocate pensions not in strict proportionality to
contributions.71
The idea of risk sharing emerges in areas beyond social security as well.
For example, in the 2017 judgment on the Slovakian challenge on the
Council decision on redistributing those who fled war and destitution
across the EU Member States, the Court stressed that the risk to be the
first country of arrival for those migrant was unevenly distributed among
Member States due to geographic realities, and that the resulting burdens
‘must . . . be divided between all the other Member States, in accordance
68 Opinion in case C-163/17, Jawo, EU:C:2018:613, paragraph 145.
69 This is also reflected in the Court’s ruling, though with the proviso that the first country
may refuse to transfer the refugee if it obtains objective and credible evidence of a risk of
degrading treatment in the country of first application (EU:C:2019:218).
70 Case C-350/07 ECLI:EU:C:2009:127, paragraph.
71 For example Case C-218/00 Cisal EU:C:2002:36, paragraph 39–40; C-219/97 Drijvende
Bokken ECLI:EU:C:1999:437, paragraph 65.
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with the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility’.72 The
Grand Chamber also rejected the Slovakian submission that solidarity
only entails voluntary engagement to the extent the Member State deci-
des without being bound by a legal obligation. Another example on the
idea of risk sharing as an emanation of solidarity is found in the
Medisanus case on the question whether a Member State may ban
blood products using blood donated outside its borders.73 Expanding
on the concept of solidarity underlying Directive Dir 2004/18/EC, the
Court explained that ‘(a)ll blood donors act in the interest of all indivi-
duals with whom they share the same interests by making it possible,
together, inter alia to guard against the risks of insufficient quantities of
medicinal products derived from blood or plasma.’74
4.4.2 Functional Types: Solidarity Embedding Internal
Market Law Concepts or Individual Rights, while EU Law
Concepts Cannot Be Curbed by National-based Solidarity
Both mutuality and risk sharing remain decisive in rulings where the
Court uses functional types of solidarity.
Starting with the Poucet and Pistre case,75 the Court has recognised
national provisions protecting universal service providers from competi-
tion as justified through the principle of solidarity. For example, the
Court argues that ‘organisations involved in the public social security
system fulfil an exclusively social function . . . based on the principle of
national solidarity and is entirely non-profit making. The benefits are
statutory benefits bearing no relation to the amount of contributions’76 in
order to justify entrusting the postal services with the payment of retire-
ment pensions.
Most frequently, solidarity serves to justify EU legislation limiting
individual rights.77 Yet, there are also cases where the limitation of EU
rights is justified by the need to protect national-level solidarity bonds.
This justification was used in two widely discussed cases on the question
whether a Member State can withdraw its citizenship and thus EU
72 Case C-643/15 Slovakia v. Council EU:C:2017:631 280-92.
73 Case C-296/15 Medisanus ECLI:EU:C:2017:431.
74 Ibid., paragraph 97.
75 C-159, 160/91 Poucet & Pistre ECLI:EU:C:1993:63.
76 C-185/14 EasyPay and Finance Engineering ECLI:EU:C:2015:716, paragraph 38.
77 For example, the limits of transferring the payments for a national public pension fund
into the EU pension fund are justified by the principle of solidarity informing the former
(C-166/12 Časta ECLI:EU:C:2013:792).
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citizenship. In both the Rottmann and the recent Tjebbes cases the Court
relied on the legitimacy to protect the ‘special relationship of solidarity
and good faith between it and its nationals’78
Muchmore frequently, however, the national conceptions of solidarity
are rejected as a justification for limiting EU rights. The reasoning of AG
Cruz Villalon in the infringement action against Luxembourg on the
question whether the office of a notary can be reserved for nationals of
that Member State is particularly well developed in that it uses the
solidarity bond between EU citizens in order to reject the priority of
that same solidarity bond limited to the national level ‘In so far as it has
a transnational dimension, European citizenship is founded on the exis-
tence of a community of States and individuals who share a . . . commit-
ment to solidarity. Given that, on being awarded the nationality of
a Member State, an individual is introduced into that community
of values, trust and solidarity, it would be paradoxical if membership of
that very community were to constitute the ground for preventing
a European Union citizen from exercising the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty.’79 This reasoning supports European-level
solidarity between all EU citizens and rejects a more limited national
variety. However, there are also numerous examples of judgments where
the Court rejects national emanations of solidarity without suggesting an
EU level equivalent, thus effectively sacrificing solidarity on the altar of
the EU internal market.80
5 Tentative Conclusions: Missed Opportunities Abound
It is startling to realise how frequently the Court misses the opportunity
to explain specifically what is meant by solidarity, and in this way, clarify
this key concept. By seizing that opportunity, the Court would be able to
flesh out the EU’s value base. Exploring the value of solidarity would be
particularly suitable for countering the identity-based challenges of the
EU integration project epitomised by Brexit as well as by the increasing
78 Cases C-135/08 Rottmann EU:C:2010:104, paragraph 51; C-221/17 Tjebbes et al. ECLI:
EU:C:2019:189, paragraph 33.
79 C-51/08 Commission v. Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2011:336, paragraph 138.
80 Widely criticised rulings such as Viking (Case C-438/05 International Transport
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union, EU:C:2007:772) Laval (Case C-351/
05, EU:C:2007:809) and AGET Iraklis (Case C-201/15 EU:C:2016:972) are all among
those where the parties as well as the AG stressed solidarity at national level as a potential
justification to restrict economic freedoms, for example.
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rejection of free movement of EU citizens and the refusal to exercise
international solidarity in the field of migration.
The opportunity to highlight and explore the relevance of solidarity as
one of the Union’s core values is even missed in cases where it should be
at the heart of the argument. For example, the circumstances leading to
the ruling in Gusa81 would have allowed the Court to explore the concept:
the claimant entered Ireland initially being sustained by his children,
before he worked as a self-employed builder for four years, contributing
to social security and the tax base, only to be refused job seekers’
allowance due to an alleged lack of being habitually resident in Ireland.
While the Court holds that he can rely on his free movement rights to
claim this very allowance, the reference to mutuality of contributions
remains unexplored.
Another example can be found in the DEB case on the question
whether national legislation requiring a special public interest test to be
satisfied before a legal entity can claim legal assistance for representation
in court.82 Germany had claimed, in defence of the rule, that legal
assistance is organised on the basis of solidarity, which cannot be
extended to legal entities instead of natural persons. This argument,
which bordered at limiting solidarity to a charitable emotion, was coun-
tered by AG Kokott and the Court with reference to the fact that Article
47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU),
from which the right to legal assistance derives, was not placed in the
Charter’s solidarity chapter. This formal argument is inherently uncon-
vincing, in particular as the CFREU’s Chapter IV (Solidarity) also con-
tains Articles 27 and 28 endowing works councils and trade unions with
rights. Thus, the question is rather which legal entities would profit from
legal assistance: those created to represent natural persons, or rather legal
entities such as businesses which are removed from their natural owners
through institutions such as shares. Accordingly, the Court has missed an
opportunity to fill the term ‘solidarity’ with life.
More concerning, in the Wightman ruling on the UK’s option to
unilaterally revoke the notification of its intention to withdraw from
the Union,83 the Court relied on citizenship as a fundamental status to
support its argument. However, free movement – a liberal right – is
presented as the most important aspect of citizenship, and not the partial
81 Case C-442/16 EU:C:2017:1004.
82 Case C-279/09 DEB EU:C:2010:811.
83 Case C-621/18 Wightman and Others EU:C:2018:999.
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extension of solidarity from the host Member States towards those EU
citizens who dare using their free movement rights.84 The Full Court’s
grandiose reference to Article 2 TEU including the sentence on solidarity
thus rings hollow in this regard, as the Court missed an opportunity to
elaborate on the practical relevance of this principle.
Observing and evaluating the case law using the term of solidarity, we
have exposed a high degree of inconsistency. Evaluating from a normative
perspective the Court’s approach to this ‘cardinal value of the European
Union’, one would hope that the Court follows the example of some of its
advocates general and specifies the application of this principle in those cases
where citizens expect to be included in the Union’s solidarity. The frequent
reference to the solidarity between the Member States to each other and to
the Union should not lead to obscuring the fact that solidarity is based on
mutual support of persons, which can only lead to effective riskmitigation if
there is a sufficient number of persons and the willingness of the better off to
shoulder burdens communally. Thus, the Court could make more of the
principles of solidarity in the field of EU citizenship, social policy, anti-
discrimination law and allow solidarity structures at national, transnational
and European level to conquer adverse effects of internal market law. There
is a long way towards developing a consistent approach to the principle,
which can be used in more cases than presently. Such uses could contribute
to supporting a more inclusive constitutional discourse on European inte-
gration than the mere reliance on liberal constitutional principles.
Solidarity in ECJ Case Law – Documentation of Coding
Up to March 2019 – only closed cases, those where solidarity was not
relevant are eliminated.
The column ‘category’ uses the type of solidarity as a number, the
dimension of solidarity as a capital letter, and the policy field as
a normal letter.
Types of solidarity: (1) Solidarity as charity, voluntary engagement
based on ethics, (2) Solidarity as mutual obligation, legally enforceable
[(2a) supporting MS compliance with EU law], (3) Solidarity as risk
mitigation, insurance, (4) Solidarity to embed individual rights, (5)
Solidarity to embed economic integration, (6) national solidarity recog-
nised, though it does not trump EU law obligations
84 Ibid., paragraph 64.
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Dimensions of solidarity: A Member States towards citizens (of other
MS, or their own, especially if they have moved), B Citizens’ direct
solidarity towards each other, C EU and its Member States towards
each other D International Solidarity (EU and/or its Member States to
other states)
Policy fields: (a) EU citizenship, (b) law of economic integration, (c)
immigration, asylum, area of security, freedom and justice, (d) economic
policy, including cohesion funds, (e) energy policy, (f) external relations,
(g) anti-discrimination law and social law and policy, (h) agricultural
policy, (i) other
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